made by Russell subsequent to their initial composition. In the case of Parts I and II, these represent primarily Russell's ongoing reflections on the paradoxes about classes and relations and also his growing acquaintance, during the summer and fall of 19°2, with Frege's logical and philosophical ideas. In the case of Part v, on the other hand, many alterations reflect the fact that the manuscript was not substantially altered after its initial composition in November 1900 and was probably replaced by a typescript, now lost, on which some of the alterations may have been made. (The manuscripts of Parts I, II and VII have, instead, several characteristics that identifY their service in the University Press's printshop.4) Given the rapid development of Russell's thought during the years 1901-02, the fall 1900 manuscript is terminologically and doctrinally at variance with the newer Parts written in 1901 and 1902. The existing manuscripts of Parts III and IV, are, in this respect, more similar to Part V than Parts I and II, as is that of Part VI. The manuscripts for these parts were written primarily in the fall of 1900, and, I think, not substantially revised thereafter. Unlike Part v, the revisions in Parts I II and IV are considerably less extensive and substantial. The alterations in Part III, for example, amount to about 650 words; in the manuscript of Part v, the alterations number about 3,5°0 words in a text that is two and one-half times as long. This difference is not surprising; Russell's views on quantity and order were more stable through this period than his views on number and class, because they were less affected by the concerns about foundational issues in logic that arise in Parts I and v.
The manuscripts of Parts III and IV confirm some conclusions that I reached based on the manuscript of Part v. In particular, the explicit logicist definitions of cardinal and ordinal number in terms of equivalence classes are not part of Russell's early post-Peano work. No such definitions appear in the fall 1900 manuscripts of Parts I II and IV. The relatively few mentions of them in the published texts are later insertions. (See, for example, the newly added line 4 on page 158 and the added footnote on page 167.) Instead, as Rodrfguez-Consuegra has Parts III-IV of The Principles of Mathematics 147 argued, Russell's first reflections in the fall of 1900 give a central p~ace to what Russell calls the axiom of abstraction: "whenever a relation, of which there are instances, has the twO properties of being symmetrical and transitive, then the relation in question is not primitive, but is analyzable into sameness of relation to some other term ... " (PaM, p. 166) .5 This principle is used by Russell in Part III to adjudicate between what he calls the absolute and relative theories of quantities.
It is used in Part IV to clarifY certain issues about relations and their properties ( § §210 and 211) and was apparently used to offer a definition by abstraction of ordinal numbers in the now missing manuscript version of Chapter 29. I will examine below the use to which the principle is put in Part Ill.
I. THE MANUSCRIPT TEXT
The initial leaves of the manuscript of both Parts III. and IV are dated November 19 00 . 6 The upper left-hand corner on the leaves from Part III bear the notation "Q" for Quantity. Those from Part IV bear the notation "0" for Order. There are no section numbers, and chapters are ordered internally, the first chapter of each part being labelled "Chapter I".
The list of variants is given at the end of the essay. It is constructed on the model of previous collations in this series. The list is read as follows. At the left is a number such as 15T 27· This means page 157, line 27 from the top. To the right is the reading from the first impression of the published text of The Principles of Mathematics. This is followed by a square brace and then the corresponding reading from the fall 1900 manuscript. Editorial brackets enclose my comments.
The leaves in Part III are numbered consecutively from I to 80; there are five leaves with non-standard numbers: 33 a , 45 a , 64 a , 64 b , 67 a .7 A number of leaves have double numbers. s They are taken SEA. The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell: Origins and Development (Basel: Birkhauser, 199 1 ) , pp. 5. 6 Since the manuscript of Part v is also dated November 19 00 , this suggests that Russell produced about 400 manuscript pages of work during that month.
7 3P is an inserted paragraph on the comparability of quantities of a given kind. This insertion is self-contained. and placed in the text of Chaprer 20 (The Range of from the 1899-1900 version of Part III of Principles. This includes all of Chapter II (The Range of Quantity), which becomes Chapter 20 of Principles, and a number of leaves from Chapter IV (Continuity, Zero, and Infinity).
The leaves from Part IV are numbered consecutively from I to 72, and then from 108 to 122. 9 Thus there is a substantial gap in the manuscript; the gap begins at 232: 12 of the text after the word "difficulty", and the manuscript resumes at 249: 35, with the word "but". It thus includes the last page and a half of Chapter 27, all of Chapters 28 (On the Difference between Open and Closed Series) and 29 (Progressions and Ordinal Numbers) , and all but two pages of Chapter 30 (Dedekind's Theory of Number). The gap is not a natural unit, such as a chapter or a discussion of some particular set of topics. It begins and ends in the middle of sentences. It is an unfortunate loss, since especially Chapters 29 and 30 concern topics on which Russell was making rapid progress in the fall of 1900, as we can see from the contents of section 4 of the October 1900 draft of "The Logic of Relations".IO That the lost material is not simply what is found in the published text is shown by a lengthy section of the manuscript (folios 108-10), which was omitted from the published text.
A striking fact about the extant parts of the manuscript of Part IV is the absence of the familiar phenomena of inserted or pirated leaves. Quantity), a chapter taken from the 1899-19°0 manuscript. 67a is a footnote added to a leaf taken from the 1899-19°0 version of PaM; so it was probably written with the main text in the Fall of '900. 45a is a leaf also taken from the 1899-19°0 manuscript. 64a and 64b are most of the first paragraph of Section 180. It is unclear to me whether these leaves were part of the original text or not. They are not simply newly inserted leaves, since folio 64b connects with 65 in the middle of a sentence. On the basis of the facts mentioned in footnote 20 below, they may be leaves inserted as Russell separated the material in Chapter 22 from Chapter 23. They appear in the text at 172: 24-36.
from Part III of the 1899-19°0 version of Principles.
9 There are two folios numbered 36 and two numbered 37. Russell simply misnumbered them.
IO Papers 3: 597-601. Interestingly, while Russell discusses and criticizes Dedekind's method of founding the real numbers, even in the 1899-19°0 version, no mention is made of Dedekind's work on arithmetic in that version, and there is no explicit reference to Dedekind in the fall draft of "The Logic of Relations".
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The version of Part IV written by Russell in 1899-I900 is completely intact; it is about half the length (68 leaves) of the manuscript written in the fall of 1900. The Fall I900 version introduces substantial new chapters; on the distinction between open and closed series and on Dedekind's views. What this suggests is that Russell's thought in this area was considerably clarified and extended by his growing acquaintance with Peano and his school. Certain central philosophical claims, such as the importance and irreducibility of asymmetrical relations, are already firmly in place in the earlier manuscript.II But much material is new; this is especially true of the work on closed series and the relation of separation of couples, which draws heavily on the work of Vailati.
I2
In my discussion of Part v, I noted that the manuscript used terminology and expressed views different, in certain respects, from what we find in the spring of 1902.'3 As mentioned earlier, the manuscript contains repeated references to the "axiom" of abstraction, in line with the fact that the principle is taken as an unproved primitive proposition in the October 1900 draft of "The Logic of Relations". This is always changed in the published text to the "principle" of abstraction, since the spring draft of "The Logic of Relations" offers a proof of the principle (Theorem 6.2).'4 In the manuscript, Russell uses "concept" as the overarching general category, so that points, instants, and bits of matter are regarded as concepts. (See the collation at 212: 15-21.) In the published text, Russell uses "term" for the overarching category and "concept" for the smaller of terms that may occur in a proposition "otherwise than as terms", in conformity with the classification set out in Chapter 4 of Part I of the published text. '5 It is also clear that Russell's understanding of Cantor's conception of continuity was defective when he originally wrote Part III. On page 193 of the text, Russell introduces "continuity" to mean merely that a series is dense. In a footnote to this introduction, he explains correctly why this does not properly capture the continuity of the real numbers. But this foomote supplants a footnote in the manuscript in which Russell says that the objection to the definition is that "it does not give a fixed property of a collection, but depends sometimes upon the order in which the terms are taken."16 Cantor's definition does not give a fixed property of a collection either, of course. Very soon thereafter, Russell's had dramatically clarified his understanding when he wrote Chapters 35 and 36 of Part v.
The manuscript text also sets out a conception of numbers that does not sit easily with the logicist definitions of the published text. In §200 where he is discussing whether there are unanalyzable three-place relations, Russell gives a brief account of his basic metaphysics of terms, concepts, and propositions, roughly as set out in Chapter 4 of the published text. However, the manuscript version of several sentences in this passage treat numbers as predicates whose role in numerical predications is like that of relations. That is, numbers do not occur as terms in such sentences. Rather, they are adjectives, as Russell calls them, which apply to multiplicities of objects.
I ? Here are the relevant passages (ms. fos. 30-1, my emphasis).
There are, on the other hand, concepts which can occur otherwise than as terms: such are being, numbers, and relations.
This gives the opinion that relations are always between only two terms, for a relation may be defined as any concept, other than a number, which occurs in a proposition containing more than one term.
In the first place, when a number is asserted of a collection, if the collection has n terms, there are n terms and only one concept (namely n) which is not a term. There are a couple of other back references in the manuscript. One of these occurs at 160: 17-18:
The kind of equality which consists in having the same number of parts has already been discussed in Part I r. If this indeed be the meaning of quantitative equality, then quantity incroduces no new idea. Bm it may, I think, be shown that greater and less have a wider field than whole and part, and an independent meaning.
The back reference here is to a discussion of equality in connection with whole and part. Part II of the 1899-1900 version of Principles is entitled "Whole and Part", but it contains no discussion of the kind of equality mentioned by Russell. The relevant chapters in Principles are Chapters 16 and 17 of Part II, but they likewise consider no such notion of equality. There is, of course, the notion of similarity of classes, used to define cardinal numbers. Russell was already using this notion in the October draft of "The Logic of Relations"; so, it seems likely that we have here an anticipation on Russell's part of consideration of this relation in the second part.
The only other back reference to Parts I and II in the manuscript occurs at 178: 20: "In this case, although the magnitudes are even now incapable of addition of the sort required, the quantities can be added in the manner explained in Part Ir." Once again the sort of addition in question here is the combination of two wholes to form a new whole. As noted above, this kind of addition is isolated and discussed in Part II of the 1899-1900 version of Principles, and this discussion recurs in the published text at several places, for example, at §13I. Certainly, the back reference here is to material that Russell could readily have anticipated being in Part II on the basis of his own previous writing on the subject.
By way of contrast to the back references that occur in the fall 1900 manuscript, the published text contains a number of significant and specific additions that involve Parts 1 and II. On page 167, there is a new footnote that shows how to apply Russell's proof of the principle of abstraction to the definition of magnitude: a magnitude is a class of equal quantities. There are two back references in the published text to §55 at 186: 44 and 211: 37. Since Russell allows that relations may be magnitudes, he claims that the quantities which have these relational magnitudes are particular instances of the relation, "a particularized relation". However, Russell interprets the results of §55 as showing that there are no such entities as particularized relations. 19 At 2II: 37, he writes: ''The particularized relation is a logically puzzling entity, which in Part I ( §55) we found it necessary to deny." This is, of course, not in the manuscript. Here Russell finds that his developing logical views undermine his conception of relational quantities.
There is a striking footnote on page 192 of the published text. It refers to the discussion in Part II of two different criteria for being a finite class; one using mathematical induction and the other Dedekind's definition in terms of similarity to a proper subclass. The footnote in the manuscript says simply, "See Part V." These ex~mples confirm the view that Russell wrote Parts Ill-VI without Parts I and II in hand, and that when he came to submit the manuscript in June 1902, he did not adjust the manuscripts to fit with his evolving views. Moreover, it is clear that the logicist conception of mathematics that forms the unifying theme of the published text is absent from the fall 1900 manuscript of Parts III and IV. 
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF QUANTITY
In the collection of manuscripts on the philosophy of mathematics, which Russell produced in the years 1898-1900, there is always a part '9 Russell seems wrong in this respect. The most §55 shows is that not all relations are parricularized relations. See N. Griffin and G. Zak, "Russell on Specific and Universal Relations: The Principles 0/ Mathematics, §55", History and Philosophy 0/ Logic, 3 (1982): 55-67. 20 In his recent biography of Russell, Ray Monk assumes that the fall manuscript of Principles already contained the basic logicist definitions. For example, at page 132, he writes, "By the end of the year he had produced a work of astonishing breadth and equally astonishing confidence, which sought to show that the whole of mathematics could be based on a mere handful of logical notions and axioms." No substantial evidence, based on the extant manuscripts, is offered in supporr of this very questionable assumption. He does bring forward a letter to Helen Thomas, written on 31 December 1900, the relevant part of which reads, "In OctOber I invented a new subject, which turned out to be all of mathematics, for the first time treated in its essence." The subject invented in October was the logic of relations, of course. But this rather general remark, with its suggestive use of the verb "turned out", does not justifY the assumption that the fall manuscript already incorporated and developed the idea that the logic of relations was all of mathematics, especially not in the face of the clear countervailing evidence of the manuscripts themselves. See Ray Monk, Bertrand Rwsell: the Spirit o/Solitude, I872-I92I (New York: Free P., 1996) . on Quantity. It invariably is the third or fourth part, usually third, and follows an initial part on number and one on some topic which Russell associates with logic, such as "Whole and Part". The overall structure of this Part can already be seen in the synoptic table of contents that Russell prepared for the manuscript of The Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics in I899. It has four chapters that correspond in topic and order to Chapters I9, 20, 2I, and 23 of Principles (Papers 2: 268-9). The same is true of the I899-1900 version of Principles; it has four chapters on the same topics in the same order. 21 There is also a considerable degree of doctrinal and argumentative stability in the first three of these four chapters. Russell argues that magnitudes are primitive, and that they are needed in addition to the quantities which have the magnitudes. Both relations and qualities can have magnitudes. Distances and divisibilities are in some sense naturally measurable by numbers. Other magnitudes are at best only indirectly measurable by numbers.
The situation is very different with respect to the fourth of these chapters, corresponding to Chapter 23 of the published text. Chapter IV of Part III of the I899-I900 version is entitled "Continuity, Zero, and Infinity". In it, Russell sets out the opposing triads of propositions listed as (I), (2), and (3) and (a), (b) , and (c) on page I90 of the published text. (I) That no two magnitudes of the kind are consecutive.
(2) That there is no least magnitude. 21 Chapter 22 (Zero) has no predecessor in the manuscripts. In these, "zero" is linked with continuity and infinity in the fourth chapter of the part. Zero is thought of as the supposed least quantity of a kind, parallel to infinity, the greatest quantity of the kind. In Chapter 22, this is rejected as a true definition of a zero quantity on the grounds that it fails to bring our the intrinsic connection of a zero quantity to some kind of negation.
The first leaf of the manuscript copy of Chapter 23 was originally entitled "Lero, Infinity, and Continuity", but "Zero" has been overwritten and "the Infinitesimal" inserted. Moreover, the number of this leaf appears to have originally been "55", the number of the first leaf of Chapter 22. Furthermore, the manuscript summary of Part III (fos. 78) In the I899-I900 version, Russell says that (a), (b) , and (c) can be strictly proved on the basis of what he calls the philosopher's axiom of finitude, an axiom which he clearly accepts. He states the axiom in the following passage:
The whole argument turns upon the principle by which infinite number is shown to be self-contradictory, namely: Many terms must be some definite number ofterms. 22 For the fall I900 manuscript, Russell retains many of the leaves from the I899-I900 chapter, though they are heavily overwritten. He contends that the arguments in support of (a), (b) , and (c) ultimately rest on the assumption that the principle of mathematical induction governs all numbers: This is the principle which the philosopher must be held to lay down as obviously applicable to all numbers, though he will have to admit that the more precisely his principle is stated, the less obvious it becomes. (PoM, p. 192) Russell then likens the principle of mathematical induction to the axiom of parallels; while useful in its proper place, to suppose it always true, "is to yield to the tyranny of mere prejudice" (PoM, pp. I92-3).
22 Papers r 72 reads "A given collection of many terms has some finite number of terms", but it is most important here to look at the Textual Notes to this passage on 768; 72: 6; 72: 7, and the manuscript itself. The relevant manuscript leaf was reused in the fall 1900 manuscript, and the particular principle at issue here has been overwritten by Russell. Its original form appears to me to have been: "Many terms must be some definite number of terms." Russell blots out the first two letters of the word "definite" to obtain the word "finite", which is what appears in the published text. This reading of the older manuscript certainly would have made appeal to the principle less blatantly circular. In the fall of 1900, of course, Russell was interested precisely in making the circularity obvious.
Here Russell is attacking his own earlier argument, presenting it by using the very leaves on which it was written.
A crucial fact about Part II I is that its importance diminishes as Russell's thought evolves. In his 1897 paper "The Relations of Number and Quantity", it is clear that Russell regards quantity as a central concept of mathematics and that he considers the question of how number and quantity are related as among the central questions of mathematical philosophy (Papers 2: 70). This is reaffirmed in the opening sentence of Part III of the 1899-19°0 manuscript. But Russell's discussion there suggests something quite different. Russell says that the work of Weierstrass and others has shown that all of pure mathematics should be regarded as dealing exclusively with numbers. In addition, he claims that algebra has been extended so as to cover non-numerical areas. This has led to "a greater separation of number and quantity" than has traditionally been maintained. Thus, Russell will attempt to give a theory of quantity which is independent of number (Papers J: 54). Russell also emphasizes that the antinomies concerning continuity and infinity have nothing specially to do with quantity. They are problems of a "strictly arithmetical nature" (Papers
The fall 1900 manuscript version further subordinates the importance of quantity. He argues that the work of Weierstrass, Dedekind, and Cantor and the development of non-numerical, non-quantitative mathematics, such as projective geometry and the logical calculus, show that quantity and number are "completely independent" (PaM, p. 158). Moreover, what is mathematically important about quantity is nothing peculiar to quantity. What is mathematically important about quantity is that quantities exhibit order. Theorems about quantity are in general simply special cases of theorems about order.
However I want to briefly consider the use of the principle of abstraction in Part III. There Russell uses it to argue that since equality between quantities is a reflexive, transitive, symmetric relation, there must be a property that a class of equal quantities have in common. This is the magnitude of the quantities in the class. Magnitudes of a given kind are greater or less than each other, but are never equal.
Even in the fall of 1900, Russell objected to the "definitions" generated by the principle of abstraction. 25 In an omitted section of the manuscript of Part v, Russell offers the following objection:
2) Russell tries to justify the inclusion of Part III by saying that it aims to disprove the supposition that quantity occurs in mathematics. But it doesn't seem to me that this is even a peripheral aim of most of the discussions of Part III. And this point illustrates the weakness of definitions by abstraction. For the above method will only define such numbers as are the numbers of some class: if there be others they remain indefinable!6
The principle of abstraction only gives numbers where there are classes of similar classes that have that number. If there could be numbers that were not the number of some class, the principle of abstraction would give no grounds for affirming their existence. This objection applies with considerable force to the use of the principle of abstraction in connection with quantities. The principle allows the inference of a magnitud~shared by equal quantities. Quantities are, according to Russell, spatia-temporal instantiations of magnitudes (PaM, p. 167). But there is absolutely no reason to suppose that all magnitudes of a kind will have spatia-temporal instantiations. So in general there will be magnitudes of, for example, temperature, that are never spatio-temporally instantiated. So the class of quantities having that magnitude is empry. The assumption of these magnitudes is not justified by the principle of abstraction.
The problem is compounded by Russell's views about zero magnitudes. He holds that there are many kinds of magnitudes which have a zero magnitude (e.g. distance, pleasure). The zero magnitudes of distinct kinds are distinct magnitudes; zero pleasure is not zero distance. Finally, there is no quantiry of any kind that has the zero magnitude of that kind. There is no quantiry which has the magnitude of zero distance (PaM, p. 187).
Since no quantity has a zero magnitude, the class of quantities that have a given zero magnitude is always the same, the null class. It is the same class for zero magnitudes of all kinds. So, the principle of abstraction cannot be used to justifY or differentiate these magnitudes. So we cannot define magnitudes by abstraction for precisely the reason that Russell gives in his discussion of cardinal numbers. The method will only define such magnitudes as magnitudes of some quantiry: if there be others, they remain indefinable. All zero magnitudes, by this standard, remain indefinable.
By the spring of 1901, Russell had a proof of the principle of abstraction. This is Theorem 6.2 of the final version of "The Logic of .6 Byrd, "Part v", p. 78, rhe variant for 306: 9.
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Relations". In essence, the proof is effected by the familiar device of letting the properry shared be "membership in the equivalence class". Thus the properry shared by similar classes is membership in the class of all and only those classes similar to one of them. This is the device Russell uses to give his famous logicist definition of cardinal numbers.
One might contemplate applying this idea in the case of quantities. In a footnote not in the manuscript, Russell proposes this application. This occurs on page 167: "Thus a magnitude may, so far as formal arguments are concerned, be identified with a class of equal quantities." This would have the effect of identifYing all zero magnitudes of all kinds, since the class of quantities having zero magnitude is the empry class. It would also identifY all magnitudes which were not spatia-temporally instantiated. The proof of the principle does not remove the objections that Russell himself lodged against it.
Russell's qualifier, "so far as formal arguments are concerned", also provides no assistance. A formal argument about the magnitudes of a kind would purportedly be one dealing with the formal properties and relations of the kind. So, for example, the claim that a kind of magnitude is densely ordered would be a claim about a formal properry of magnitudes of the kind. However, it could easily turn out that a collection of magnitudes, defined using classes of equal quantities, was not densely ordered even though the original class of magnitudes would naturally be held to be densely ordered. It might be that certain intensities of a colour are never spatio-temporally realized, rendering the order of equivalence classes non-dense. Thus the defined magnitudes may have formal properties which are very different from the properties of the kind of magnitude that they are supposed to represent. Geometry.]~Thus in order to obtain a measure of comparative divisibility, where all our quantities are infinitely divisible, we require two steps. First we require the judgment of equality, which is required many times in mosr measurements. We thus obtain as many equal quantities as we choose, and their common magnitude is then taken as unit. We now require that the axioms that the whole is greater than the part, and rhar sums of equals are equal. By sufficient subdivision of the unit, any two wholes can be numerically compared with any required degree of accuracy; and theoretically, by the method of limits, real numbers can always be found to effect the comparison exactly. Thus although our units are not indivisible, their number gives the relative divisibility of any aggregate of units. In this case, as in all cases except that of finire wholes, the measuring number expresses a relation to an arbitrary unir, not an intrinsic property of the magnitude measured. 179: 18-19 has, respectively, '1t'x" and '1t'y".> 203: 32 (3 
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